The national capital of youth crime concern is New York City, and some of the most profound changes in sentencing policy toward young offenders passed the New York legislature in 1976 and in 1978. 4 The 1976 reforms created the curious disjunction of an adolescent (under sixteen) who could be classified a "designated felon" in an institution that was known as the "Family Court."
5 Why New York? It is a geographically desegregated city. The poor live in close proximity to the rich. Further, unlike any other major state, before 1978 New York had no provision for waiver of individual juvenile criminals into the adult sentencing system. 6 In 1978, however, massive legislative change created a class of felony charges where the criminal court became the court of first instance for a substantial number of alleged felony offenses. 7 This article deals with the most serious youth crime, homicide. Every homicidal event that we have been able to trace by persons under twenty is allocated to the youngest offender of any group in order to provide the highest estimate of youth crime and youth homicide at younger ages. We deal only with arrest cases because those are the only cases in which ages are known.
The following six short sections deal with the volume and rate of youth homicide, variations in rate by age of youngest offender, variations over time and the question of deterrence, the contrast in homicides over age spans by type, robbery and robbery killing, and gun availability.
I. THE VOLUME AND RATE OF YOUTH HOMICIDE
A major problem in depending on police statistics is that kids live their lives and commit their crimes in groups. 8 In order to reduce homicide 4 Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, ch. 878, § 753-a, 1976 N.Y. Laws, as amended by the juvenile justice reform amendment of 1978, ch. 478, 1978 7 See Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, ch. 878, § 712(h) , 1976 N.Y. Laws: "'Designated felony act'. An act committed by a person fourteen or fifteen years of age which, if done by an adult, would be a crime (i) defined in sections 125.27 (murder in the first degree); 125.25 (murder in the second degree); 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); or 150.20 (arson in the first degree) of the penal law; (ii) defined in sections 120.10 (assault in the first degree); 125.20 (manslaughter in the first degree); 130.35 (rape in the first degree); 130.50 (sodomy in the first degree); 135.20 (kidnapping in the second degree) but only where the abduction involved the use or threat of use of deadly physical force; 150.15 (arson in the second degree); or 160.15 (robbery in the first degree) of the penal law; or (iii) defined in the penal law as an attempt to commit murder in the first or second degree or kidnapping in the first degree."
8 Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-known Secret, 72 J. Criminal Law and Criminology 867 (1981). arrests to homicidal events, it was necessary to review the police arrest logs of every killing involving a suspect under twenty to discern how many homicides, as opposed to how many homicide arrests, young suspects were responsible for. Table I tells the statistical tale both for juveniles (under sixteen) and for sixteen-to nineteen-year-olds. Table I contains two statistical surprises. First, homicide events involving juveniles under sixteen are rare events in New York City. We cannot know age brackets for uncleared cases, but police arrests of persons under sixteen involve killings on an average of about thirty-five a year, a rate much smaller than the general homicide rate. 9 The second surprise is the general decline in juvenile homicide since 1973. From this evidence, the best projection ofjuvenile homicide as a proportion of total New York City homicide is between 2 and 4 percent of the aggregate totals.' 0 Older offenders, already within the jurisdiction of the criminal court, are much " The homicide clearance rate for the first six months of 1980 was 59.2 percent, which suggests that actual average number of homicides by the under-sixteen group is fifty-seven.
10 If we were to take the juvenile homicide rate for 1980 (see unnumbered table below) and divide by the clearance rate, we would get 0.56 homicides per 100,000, or 2.2 percent of the aggregate rate of 25.8 homicides per 100,000 in the city. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1980 Reports, (1981 at 76. The average homicide rate projected over 1980 produced a figure equal to a little more than 3 percent of the aggregate rate. more likely to be involved in homicidal events, as shown in Figure 1 . Using the admittedly rough categories of thirteen-to fifteen-year-olds (juvenile court jurisdiction) and sixteen-to nineteen-year-olds (criminal court jurisdiction), the difference in the rate per 100,000 homicidal occasions is at a level exceeding three to one. " And this statistical portrait is based on the age of the youngest offender, therefore biasing the blame toward the youngest individual implicated in a particular homicide event.
II. VARIATIONS BY AGE OF YOUNGEST OFFENDER
The previous section discussed relative rates of homicide in adolescence using two rough categories, under sixteen and sixteen to nineteen.
" The number of homicides by thirteen-to fifteen-year-olds for the period 1974-80 is 217. The number committed by sixteen-to nineteen-year-olds for the same period is 941 which, if deflated by 25 percent to account for the extra year, is 3.3 times as high as the younger sample. 
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100,000 population-New York City, Figure 2 carries this analysis forward by graphically portraying event rates by the age of youngest offender by individual age for the total sample of arrest events, 1973-80. The visually striking aspect of Figure 2 is the steady progression of homicide rates through the teenage years. For the merged sample, the relationship between age category and number of homicidal events is perfect. And the rank-order correlations for the individual years in the sample are strikingly high. 12 The transition birthday between family court and adult court jurisdiction is associated with one of the largest numerical increases in homicide events (213 for the sixteenyear-olds vs. 149 for the fifteen-year-olds) despite the sharp escalation prior to 1978 in threatened penalties for sixteen-year-olds. The higher rate for sixteen-year-olds persists when pre-1978 cases are analyzed separately. 13 Previous analysis of gross arrest figures suggests the same steady progression through the adolescent years.1 4 But we are unaware of persuasive, empirically based theories to explain the phenomenon. The teen years are a developmental period involving rapid physical, psychological, and social change.' 5 Amounts of leisure time, weapon availability, and patterns of socialization all seem likely candidates as variables affecting rates of interpersonal violence within adolescence. Untangling the contributions of these and other variables associated with age is no small task. But examining the qualitative differences between low-rate and high-rate years in adolescence, as well as the qualitative differences between teenage and adult violence, can provide some clues.
1II.
VARIATIONS OVER TIME Table 2 sets out official arrest data published by the New York Police Department for the period 1970-80 for suspects under sixteen (the family court group) and for suspects sixteen to nineteen (the criminal court group). The data reported in Table 2 are arrests rather than events, an inferior measure of patterns over time or between age groups., 6 They merit publication, however, because individual homicide arrest reports are unavailable prior to 1973 in New York, and the data on juvenile homicide arrests during the early 1970s are puzzling. Briefly stated, homicide arrests under sixteen (a) increased by a factor of five in a fouryear period, (b) reached their peak in 1973 (the first year we were able to obtain an event sample), (c) declined during a period when there were no major legal changes, and finally stabilized. These extreme fluctuations are not paralleled in the official reports dealing with suspects over sixteen, although the figures for sixteen-to nineteen-year-olds were far from stable.' 7 The unavailability of data prior to 1973 is a serious blow to a time-"3 Sixteen-year-olds only made up 55.7 percent of the homicides committed by the two age groups before 1978, they made up 66.9 percent of the post-1978 homicides committed by fifteen-and sixteen-year-olds.
14 Zimring, supra note 2, at ch. I.
15 Franklin E. Zimring, The Changing Legal World of Adolescence (1982) see chs. 3.6. 10, & 11. 6 Zimring, supra note 8. 17 The ratio between the 1973 peak and the 1970 low for the older group is only 2.6. Special attention should be paid to the direction of the fluctuations between the two groups. series design attempting to assess legal impacts later in the decade. 8 We must note that 1973 may not have been New York's most typical baseline year. Table 3 presents annual data on homicide events for the total family court group in the left-hand column and the number of homicide events excluding arson cases in the right-hand column. The reason for this double reporting is the extraordinary leverage the clearance of an arson case can have on homicide events as a dependent variable. Because each killing of a human being counts as an event, one large fire-if cleared by arrest-may make a substantial statistical dent in the events we use as a measure of underlying fluctuations in the homicide rate.
Yet there is reason to believe that fluctuations over time in the number of fire fatalities leading to juvenile arrests is a very poor measure of juvenile arson or of juvenile arson murder. In 1978 and 1980, arson fatalities constitute about 20 percent of the event sample. In other years there are no such cases. To use arson homicide clearances in a study of a general deterrent impact of legal change on youthful arson over time is hazardous indeed. ' 18 There are a number of statistical problems associated with small sample sizes. If a time series starts with an extreme value, then a "regression artifact" will be created "sufficient to explain the occurrence of subsequent less extreme values." Donald T. 19 Arson is a crime with low clearance rates by arrest, unknown death rates per 1,000 events, and likely changes in police policy through the 1970s as it commanded increased In any event, we performed an interrupted time-series analysis focusing on the 1976 and 1978 legislation both with and without arson victimization. The first stage of this procedure was a before-and-after analysis of the target group of the legal changes, those under sixteen. There were statistically significant decreases associated with the time periods after the two "crackdowns" in the family court group that was the target of the intervention. 2 0 A second time-series analysis was performed on the sixteen-to nineteen-year-olds to help us arbitrate between the passage of the public attention. In this study, using arson deaths as an index would produce zero values for five of the seven years. 20 We regressed the quarterly number of homicides (murders and nonnegligent manslaughters) for the under-sixteen group on two dummy variables. The first, DQ76, accounted for the effect of the 1976 legislation; the second, DQ78, accounted for the effect of the 1978 legislation (see unnumbered table below). Time period: 1978 through the first two quarters of 1981 for a total of thirty-four observations. The Durbin-Watson statistic, used to measure autocorrelation in the residuals, was consistently good throughout the regressions, which indicates that there was no time dependence despite the general declining trend in homicides. The adjusted R 2 is the percentage of variation in the quarterly homicides statistically "explained" by the variation in the regressor(s). B is the size of the "effect." The tstatistic shows by how much the coefficient is statistically significant, that is, different from zero. The significance level shows the probability that the t-statistic might have happened purely by chance. We also regressed the actual quarterly homicides against three hypothetical crackdowns: one occurring several quarters before the 1976 crackdown, one occurring between the two, and one occurring several quarters after the 1978 crackdown. The earlier the crackdowns took effect, the stronger the "impact" appeared to be, suggesting that the statistical significance of the actual crackdowns is a result of their coincidence with the general downward trend of the quarterly homicides.
Regressors
Adjusted In a truly controlled experiment, when the group that did not brush with
Crest has the same number of cavities as the group that did, this is pretty conclusive evidence. In a quasi-controlled experiment, life is not that simple. 22 One or both of the laws may have had a marginal general deterrent impact on the behaviors that generate youth homicide. There is simply no credible evidence of this to be found in our data.
IV. PATTERNS OF YOUTH HOMICIDE
Patterns of homicide among teenagers in New York differ from killings by adults: the younger the offender, the greater the difference. These differences principally involve the nature of the offense rather than the characteristics of the offender. Table 4 sets out demographic characteristics of youngest offenders in the two youth samples, and a "control" sample that was compiled by collecting information on the first five ar-2' The results for the sixteen-to-nineteen group, first including arson cases, then with arson cases screened out, are shown in the table below. For total homicides, the occurrence of the two crackdowns did a better job of explaining the variation in the sixteen-to-nineteen control group than for the under-sixteen target group. With arson cases screened out, the opposite result came out, but the difference between the two groups was small, particularly in the case of the second crackdown (.206 vs. .193 The demographic similarity of the offender groups contrasts with differences in victim characteristics. Further, the killing of females in nonrobbery situations is lower among both teenage groups than among adults. 25 Finally, and of particular interest in later sections of this study, the youngest offender group dispropor-23 Comparing the under-sixteen group with the sixteen-to-nineteen group produced a X 2 of 0.02, meaning that the proportion of female offenders was roughly the same in both groups. However, comparing the under-sixteen group with the over twenty sample produced a X 2 of 4.8, significant below the .05 level, indicating a small but significant difference between the two groups as far as the male/female ratio was concerned. tionately killed victims that can be considered "soft targets," children twelve and under and adults aged sixty and over.
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Young offenders are more likely to kill in groups, more likely to be engaged in collateral felonies, and less likely to kill alone than older offenders. Figure 3 tells the story. A crucial feature is that we are here dealing with proportions rather than volume, across age categories with grossly different rates of offending. Thus, while a greater proportion of fourteen-year-olds who kill are involved in collateral felonies, a far larger number of nineteen-year-olds commit robbery murder.
2 7 And the curves, in this case declining as age increases, are close to a mirror image of the ascending curve noted for homicide volume.
8 This pattern can best be interpreted as a "missing case" phenomenon in early and midadolescence. Statistically, the extremely low volume of nonfelony homicide results in the high concentration of felony cases. Examining the behavior of extremely low-rate groups, such as fourteen-and fifteen-yearold homicide offenders (or female robbers),-is important for the informa- The distinction between proportion and rate is also crucial when looking at variations in weapon use, the task of Table 6 . Gun use in homicide is lower in the lower age groups, and steadily progresses through the teen years from 46 percent to 56 percent of total killings. The increase in gun proportion comes at the expense of killings committed by "personal force" and other weapons, which account for almost twice the share of killings committed by the youngest offenders.
Still, firearms are the leading cause of deaths attributable to thirteenyear-olds. Is this because it is extremely difficult to kill without a gun, or is it evidence that firearms are available to the very young in New York City? One clue to resolving this question is to shift the analysis from proportion to volume. The number of gun homicides attributable to nineteen-year-olds alone exceeds the volume of gun deaths attributable to the total population of offenders under sixteen. And the 46 percent firearms The third special criminological characteristic of robbery is that, unlike aggravated assault, it is a crime that is likely to cross ethnic and particularly racial lines. This is not to say that minorities, particularly black, are not more prone to robbery victimization than white urban residents. However, interracial robbery is by far the most common face-to-face offense that is apt to involve a black offender and a white victim.
36
No wonder, then, that the archetype of ajuvenile "thug" that animates political discussion of the type that led to New York's 1976 and 1978 crackdowns is a black or Hispanic youth engaged in robbery. A 1973 national survey of robbery victims found that the victim guessed the offender's age at under twenty-one in 53 percent of the cases in which that information was available. An analysis of those same data indicated that offenders under twenty-one were more likely to inflict some kind of injury (as opposed to merely threatening force) than were older offenders. 3 7 It is not possible to estimate with any precision the rate of robbery attributable to any specific age group in New York from the data generated by this study. Age-specific data in official criminal justice files are arrest data, and a minority of robbery events in New York City or any urban area result in arrest. Still, arrest statistics can be used as a very rough index of robbery participation by age, as I have done in Table 7 .
The data produced in Table 7 cannot be regarded as a precise measure of the relative participation of different age groups in robbery, because it cannot safely be assumed that clearance' rates are evenly distributed 33 The robbery rate per 100,000 people was reported as 243.5 in 1980. up 14.8 percent from the previous year. Forcible rape in 1980 was 36.4 per 100,000, up 5.5 percent. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1980 Reports, (1981 14 Inmates convicted of robbery are 21.6 percent of the federal prison population. An additional 0.7 percent were convicted for burglary. Although percentages for the aggregate state populations were unavailable, we found three individual states: Wisconsin, 46.9 percent for robbery and burglary; Michigan, 25.4 percent for robbery, 12.6 percent for burglary: Virginia, 23 percent for robbery, 17.8 percent for burglary. Sources: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Source Book of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1980 Statistics, (1981 among age groups. And of course young robbers are more often arrested in groups. 3 8 Still, even as a rough estimate, Table 7 suggests that the volume of youth robbery in New York is large, even in early age brackets, and that the age distribution within the youth group is surprisingly flat.
In 1980, more than eight hundred twelve-and thirteen-year-olds were arrested for various grades of robbery by the New York police. The relatively flat distribution across ages begins at fourteen, where the volume of arrests escalates to twelve hundred in 1980. By age sixteen, the peak age of robbery arrests in six of the seven years represented in Table  6 , the volume of arrests fluctuates around two thousand on an annual basis, plus or minus two hundred and fifty arrests, during the seven years observed. 39 But it is misleading to speak of a "peak age" of arrest with this distribution. During three years of mid-adolescence, fifteen to seventeen, the volume of arrests is almost indistinguishably high. After age seventeen, the trend is pronouncedly downward in arrest volumes for the older offenders. The size of this downward movement in robbery arrests of eighteen-and nineteen-year-olds is not consistent with national trends and may suggest the limits of arrest volume as an indicator of robbery behavior in New York . 4 0 Robbery varies from relatively trivial schoolyard extortions to life-threatening events that generate a majority of all killings that involve collateral felonies. 4 ' Police policy at the lower end of the 38 Zimring. supra note 8.
3 Average number of arrests equals 1,977.7: standard deviation equals 185.1. 40 Particularly since the FBI estimated the peak arrest age for robbery to be eighteen. Zimring, supra note 2. at 37. This discrepancy can be explained by the low clearance rate for urban robberies: 20.1 percent for cities with populations over I million. scale of seriousness can produce very substantial differences in the age distribution of robbery arrests that make comparisons over time or between jurisdictions appear quite different even though underlying patterns of robbery behavior are similar.
There is one method of investigating the relationship between age and robbery seriousness that sheds light on the differences ascending age may make in the composition of robbery events. Figure 4 integrates the data we gathered on homicide events involving robbery with official arrest statistics on robbery by age. For the death statistics, the age of the youngest arrested offender determines the age category where the homicide is attributed. The rates reported in Figure 4 are not death rates per thousand robberies but rather rates per thousand robbery arrests. In that sense they are artificial: the reader should recall that the bulk of robbery events do not result in arrests and many robbery events result in multiple arrests. However, the differences observed in the death rate index are both consistent and stunning. The consistency observed is in the ascending death rate when all that is known is the age of the youngest offender. Put simply, and merging a seven-year sample, one seems about seven times as likely to die in a robbery involving a youngest offender age nineteen than a youngest offender age fourteen. Moreover, there is almost an invariable quality to this over the aggregate period and the years individually. To remove age-artificial effects that might be produced by including a group that is twelve and thirteen, I have deleted them from a rank-order correlation procedure. On the aggregate sample the correlation between age of youngest offender (beginning at age fourteen) and predicted death rate is large for the merged seven-year sample and remains high when each age group's annual performance is treated as a separate observation. 4 2 These data carry three implications. First, it is impossible to look at death rates this different and regard robbery as a homogeneous event.
What fourteen-year-olds do, even with their older friends, is different from what nineteen-year-olds do. And the method of classification usedassigning responsibility to the youngest offender-should bias the statistical findings against this dramatic ascending pattern. Second, when one considers the literature asserting that younger offenders attack and injure more often, together with death rates that are probably under one in a thousand for youthful muggings, the fact that guns and knives are used less often in younger adolescent robbery begins to suggest powerful instrumentality effects (the more lethal the instrument, the greater the death rate per thousand). These data also suggest that police classification in the high-volume younger years includes a huge proportion of non-lifethreatening robbery events. Third, the increase with age of robbery deaths suggests some kind of ascending socialization to escalated levels of violence. Is it guns and knives? Is it different situations? Is it a qualitative rather than quantitative difference in the nature of the robbery event?
Some of these questions will be addressed presently. At this point, it should be noted that the negative correlation between robbery arrest rates and deaths attributed to robbery that is found among fourteen-to 42 We also regressed the death rate per thousand robberies, broken down by year, on the age of the youngest offender. The result was a coefficient that was significant at the <.001 level and an adjusted R 2 of .485. In other words, the age of the youngest offender accounted for roughly half of the variation in the death rates when each year of experience for each age group was treated as a separate observation. The compressed sample of all seven years yielded an adjusted R 2 of .728 and a coefficient also good at the <.001 level.
nineteen-year-olds should be a caution against the use of aggregate crime statistics that lump all robbery as a single category in research or policy analysis.
VI. A FURTHER NOTE ON GUNS
Three pieces of circumstantial evidence emerging from this study suggest that weapon use, independent of intention, determines death rates from assault. The first concerns the disparity between assault rates and death rates in early adolescence. No matter how porous American gun policy may be, it is much easier to get a gun at nineteen than at fourteen. Simple assault rates during adolescence are higher in New York (and elsewhere) than during any other period of human development. However, the death rates reported here from common assault are very small. Do early adolescent criminals have different assaultive intentions? Certainly. Are these differential intentions sufficient to explain the enormous differences in death rate and the low absolute volume of juvenile homicide? My best guess is no. Homicide events increase by a factor of more than four to one between age fourteen and age nineteen. The present study encompasses enough years so that we can observe a "cohort" aging from fourteen to nineteen and escalating its propensity toward lethal violence by a factor of 3.60 during a period of declining youth homicide rates. If weaponry does not play a role, how else can we explain this contrast?
The second piece of circumstantial evidence concerns robbery: if a robbery involving a fourteen-year-old is more likely to result in an injury, why is it a fraction as likely as a robbery involving a nineteen-year-old to result in death? The fact that early adolescent offenders are more frequently arrested in groups means that seven to one should not be taken as a magic number indicating differential death rates from robbery events. Yet every robber in a group situation is capable of inflicting lifethreatening damage. And all of the mediating variables-target selection, group involvement, weapons, and goal-cannot intuitively explain agespecific differences in death rates, because they may well be results rather than causes of the different structure of robbery.
The third element of circumstantial evidence on the matter of instrumentalities and death rates concerns the victims of early adolescent homicide. Quite simply, the larger proportion of soft target victims may be a classic instance of the "missing case" phenomenon. The larger proportion of older adults is again evidence of who New York City's early adolescents do not kill as much as it is testimony to those who die. Lacking the armaments of their older peers, early adolescents in New York kill more often those who can be killed more easily. This analysis suggests an entire series of missing cases: those involving low vulnerability groups where only weapons of lethal destructive impact lead to higher death rates.
Taken together, these three additional pieces of circumstantial information strike me as of special significance. It is ironic, but retrospectively understandable, that this study generates data about lethal weapons where the initial design was a study of marginal general deterrence. I followed the data where they led me.
VII. CONCLUSION
Eight years of New York homicide have been scrutinized in a study of youth homicide. The study began as an examination of marginal general deterrent effects, a hopeless task given the available data. The study confirms the central importance of youth on patterns of criminal violence. The distinctive patterns and lower death rates associated with early adolescent crime may provide clues about what factors produce higher death rates when older offenders engage in predatory crime. The sharp differences in death rates by age also caution against generalizations based on aggregation of offenses committed by younger and older offenders. Finally, the steady progression of dangerousness through the teenage years provides one promising window into the developmental processes that produce high death rates from criminal violence in the city.
Given the data base, unmanageable in 1973 and not completely reliable in the years after, this should be seen as a first study rather than a definitive portrayal of juvenile homicide in New York let alone any other city. Yet what studies of this kind attempt to do, in my view, is at the center of the criminal law of violence. Understanding age progressions in violence appears critical to understanding the mechanisms of violence itself. Understanding the driving mechanisms of violence is crucial to a criminal law of violence. Few principles of punishment, no legislation, and no redesign of the criminal law's reactive system of sanctions can fail to benefit from deeper understanding of the behavioral dimensions of violence.
